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Attorney and Client-Champierty- What Constitutes.
An agreement between client and attorney, by which, in consideration of an assignment to the attorney of a judgment obtained by him for
th% client, the attorney agrees to render legal services in an effort to
collect the judgment, to advance costs and expenses in the first instance,
one-half to be repaid by the client in case of failure, and the net proceeds
of the judgmenf in case of success to be equally divided, is not without
consideration, nor unlawful on the ground of champerty, and, if otherwise valid, will be enforced.
Opinion by SPEAR, C. J.
AGREEMENTS FOR COMPENSATION BETWEEN ATTORNEY AND CLIENT.

I. The English Rule.-In Kennedy v. Brown, 13 C. B. (N. S.), 677,
there was directly presented the
question whether the express promise of the client to pay the advocate for his professional services
constituted a legal obligation, and
the Court decided that it did not,
though it was admitted that such a
promise made with an attorney for
his services, or even with a barrister in connection with services other
than those of advocacy in litigation, could be enforced. The reason for the rule was thus expressed
by Chief JusticeERLE: The advocate "is trusted with interests and
privileges and powers almost to an
unlimited degree. His client must
trust to him at times for fortune
and character and life. The law
trusts him with a privilege in respect of liberty of speech which is
1 Reported

in 31 N. E. Rep., 747.

in practice bounded only by his own
sense of duty; and he may have to
speak upon subjects concerning
the deepest interest of social life,
and the innermost feelings of the
human soul. The law also trusts
him ,mith a power of insisting on
answers to the most painful questioning, and this power, again, is
in practice, only controlled by his
own view of the interests of truth.
It is of the last importance that the
sense of duty should be in active
energy proportioned to the magnitude of these interests. If the law
is, that the advocate is incapable of
contracting for hire to service when
he has undertaken an advocacy, his
words and acts ought to be guided
by a sense of duty, that is to say,
duty to his client, binding him to
exert every faculty and privilege
and power in order that he may
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maintain that client's right, together with duty to the Court and
himself, binding him to guard
against abuse of the powers and
privileges entrusted to him by a
constant recourse to his own sense
of right."
II. The American Rule. -In
nearly all of the States the doctrine thus laid down is held to be
inapplicable to the social conditions ot this country and not a part
of our inheritedjurisprudence. See
the note ofJudge MITCHELL to Kennedy v. Broun, sufira Am. Law Reg.
(N. S.), 372. A representative case
is Bayard v. McLane, 3 Harr., 219,
where it is said by the Court: "The
English doctrine on this subject is
founded on considerations of public policy, which, in general, is one
of the most uncertain and therefore
unsafe grounds of legal judgment.
Doubtless where the policy is clear
it is good ground of decision, but
like all arguments ab convenienti,
of which it is one, the weight, and
even the existence of the inconvenience may be doubtful, or may be
counterbalanced by a greater inconvenience on the other side. (Ram.
on Legal Judgment, 57.1 Itisalsoan
unstable ground of judgment, varying with the conditions of the same
community, and applicable only
to communities similarly situated.
The policy of the law springs out
of the condition of the people who
are to be bound by it. In England
it has been deemed against public
policy to permit counsel to contract with their clients for compensation, first, because of some vague
notion that it would be against the
dignity of the profession to demand
fees; and, secondly, from the apprehension that clients might be
oppressed by such bargains; yet,
whatever is the theory, we know

that, in point of fact, the counsel
does take fees under the polite
name of honoraria; nay more, that
being unable to recover anything
by the aid of law, he requires the
cash in hand before he opens his
mouth in the cause. Is there no
doubt about the policy of a principle that operates thus? Is there
less danger of oppression of the
client in requiring payment of the
money down, than by taking his
contract or bond? The lawyer in
either case makes his own terms,
which the client either agrees to
or employs another. But the poor
suitor may not have the present
means of payment, and this policy
may deprive him of counsel. He
may have credit-credit founded
even on his rights in the suit which
he is about to prosecute -credit
especially with the lawyer, who understands those rights; but for
want of money to pay down in advance, the courts of justice may be
effectually closed against him. His
rights are nothing unless he can
have the means of enforcing them."
But it is to be noted that the English rule, drawing a distinction between attorneys and advocates, has
been recognized in New Jersey. In
Schomp v. Schenck, 40 N. J. Law,
195, it was said by the learned judge
who delivered the opinion, "The
American decisions on the subject
have not been overlooked, and it is
quite understood that the weight of
such decisions is in favor of considering the English doctrine relating
to this topic, even as it relates to
advocates, as obsolete and inapplicable to the times. All I wish tt,
say is that I cannot concur in this
view, for the rule in question has
always flourished in full vigor as a
part of the common law, and has
never, during any interval of time,
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fallen into disuse; and that, as its
only foundation was its supposed
-efficacy in sustaining the honor-ble standing of the advocate, I can
by no means admit that such a rule
is alien to the professional ethics of
this country. The principle that
the advocate cannot stipulate with
'his client for his perquisites is one
,of the established customs of our
inherited jurisprudence, and is entirely consistent with our social
conditions, and therefore, in my
,opinion, is not to be eliminated except by legislation."
III. Contingent Fees. -Assuming, then, the validity of an
-express contract between the attorney or counsellor-at-law and
his client for the payment by
-the latter for professional services
to be rendered by the former, we
'turn to examine those cases where
the contract is for the payment of
contingent fees. Such contracts are
-lways jealously scrutinized by the
Court on account of the confidential relations of the parties, and no
unconscionable bargain will be sustained; but, on the other hand,
when made in good faith, without
suppression of facts or exaggeration
-of apprehended difficulties, and the
compensation stipulated for is reasonable, they will, in the Federal
courts, and, it is believed, in those
,of all the States except Tennessee,
'be enforced as not oppose to public
-policy." Ex parte Plitt, 2 Wall.,
Jr., 453; Wylie v. Coxe, 15 How.,
415; Wright v. Tibbits, 1 Otto, 252;
Jeffries v. M. L. Ins. Co., IIo U.S.,
305; McPherson v. Coxe, 6 Otto,
404; Post r,. Mason, 91 N. Y., 539;
Dahms v. Sears, 13 Or., 47; Perry
v. Dicken, 1o5 Pa., 83; Kusterer v.
Beaver, 56 Wis., 471; Walker v.
Biety, 24 La., 349; Whithead v.
Ducker, ixi S. M. (Miss.), 98; Quint
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v. Ophis, 4 Nev., 305; Christy v.
Sawyer, 44 N. H., 98; South v.
State, I7 Ark., 608; Backus v. Byron, 4 Mich., 535; Bent v. Priest,
io Mo. App., 543; Jewel v. Neidy,
6r Iowa, 235; Stansell v. Lindsay,
5o Ga,, 36o; Newkirk v. Cohen, 18
Ill., 449 ; but in England they have
been held void under the statutes
against maintenance, Earle v. Hopwood, 9 C. B., 566.
Contracts to pay contingent fees
for professional services in preparing and advocating just claims
against the government have also
been supported in this country.
Stanton v. Emery, 3 Otto, 548; Taylor v. Bemiss, zio U. S., 42.
But contracts for lobbying are not
recognized as professional services
of a legitimate character and are
void. Trist v. Child, 21 Wall. 450.
Where, however, the contract
provides that no compromise or
settlement of the case shall be made
without the consent of the attorney,
it has been held in some of the
States that such a condition is conIra bonos mores, and the contract
void. Wukley v. Hall, 13 Stanton
Ohio R.. z75; Taylor v. Gilman, 58
N. H., 417; Boardman v. Thompson, 25 Iowa, 487.
Though in others, such condition
has been held not to be against
public policy. Hoffman v. Vallejo,
45 CaL, 564.
But a receiver of a national bank
has no power to contract to pay a
contingent fee (Barrett v. Henrietta Bk., 78 Texas, 222), nor a municipal corporation (County of
Chester v. Barber, 97 Pa., 455), nor
county commissioners (Platt v.G'er"
rard, 12 Neb., 244).
IV. The Effect of the Rules
against Champertry on Contracts
between Attorney and Client.Such seems to be the law bearing
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on contracts between lawyer and
client outside of the doctrine of
champerty, and it is now proposed
to briefly examine how far in this
country they are effected thereby.
Blackstone defines champerty as
"a species of maintenance and
punished in like manner; being a
bargain with a plaintiff or defendant campum parice, to divide the
land or other matters sued for between them, if they prevail at law;
whereupon the champertor is to
carry on the suit at his own expense," while Hawkin's definition,
followed by Coke and Sir William
Grant, is "the pnlawful maintenance of a suit in consideration of
a part of a debt or other thing in
dispute."
The English cases adopt the definition of Hawkins, Stanley v. Jones,
7 Bing., 369; Sprye v. Porter, 7 El.
& Bl., 8o; In re Attorneys and Solicitors Act, i Ch. Div., 573.
Champerty so defined has been
declared part of the common law
of Massachusetts (Lathrop v. Bank,
9 Met., 491; Ackert v. Barker, 131
Mass., 436, but held not to apply
to contracts to prosecute cases before Court of Claims. Murray v.
Sprague, 148 Mass., i8), Indiana
(Scobey v. Ross, 13 Ind., 177, and
it applies to contracts to prosecute
cases against the government, Coquillard v. Bears, 21 Ind., 479),
Kentucky (Davis v. Sharron, i5 B.
Mon., 64, though a contract for a
fee equal to one-quarter of the value
of land recovered by suit, not to be
paid until land should be sold was
held not champertous in Ramsey v.
-Trent, io B. Mon., 34I), and North
Carolina (Martin p, Amos, 13 Ire.,
201), and contracts by which the at-torneys are to be paid for theirservi.ces a part of the -money or thing
recovered are there held void, ire-

spective of who paid the expenses
of the suit. These cases hold that
the mode of comfensation constitututed at common law the gist of the
offence. To this group should be
added Tennessee by whose code,
2450, it is provided, "No party
plaintiff or intending to be plaintiff to a suit at law or in equity shall
promise or agree to pay or give any
greater or less sum of money or any
greater or less part of the thing litigated upon any contingency or
upon the event of the suit," and
probably Alabama (Elliott v. McClelland, i7 Ala., 2o6), District of
Columbia (Stanton v. Haskin, i
McArthur, 558), New Hampshire
(Butler v. Legre, 62 N. H., 35o), and
Maine, since there is no statute ,in
that State governing the matter,
and it has been decided that whatever was part of the common law
of Massachugetts before the separation of Maine from that State is
part of the law of Maine to-day unless changed by legislation (Hovey
v. Hobson, 51 Me., 62), though
these cases have not in so many
words approved of Hawkin's definition.
Each of the following States has
declared that only the modified rule
against champerty as defined by
Blackstone is part of its common
law and therefore contracts by an
attorney for a contingent fee out of
the avails of the suit have only been
held void where the attorney has
agreed to pay the costs:
Delaware (Bayard v. McLane, 3
Harr., 139), Georgia (Moses v. Bagley, 55 Ga., 283), Illinois kWest
Park Coms. v. Coleman, xo8 Ill.,
591), Iowa (Jewel v. Neidy, 61 Iowa,
299) Missouri (Duke v. Harper, 66
Mo., 5i), Mississippi (Moody v.
Harper, 38 Miss., 6oi), West Virginia (Anderson v. Caraway, 27 W.
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Va., 396),Virginia (Nickels v. Kane,
82 Va., 3o9), Wisconsin (Allard v.
Lamirande, 29 Wis., 502), Kansas
(Aultman v. Waddle, 4o Kan., 195),
and Ohio (for such seems the effect
of the decision in the case at the
head of this note).
And to them should probably be
added South Carolina (Hand v. R.
R. Co., 21 S. Car., 182), Maryland
W. U. Tel. Co. v. Semmes & Clark,
73 Md., i9), Oregon (Dahms v.
Sears, 13 Or., 47), Nevada (Gruber
v, Baker, 20 Nev., 468), and Rhode
Island (Martin v. Clark, 8 R.I.,
389, and see note to Orr v. Tanner,
17 Am. Law Reg., 759), though the
position of the Courts of these*is
not clearly defined.
These cases hold that at common
law the gist of the offence was the
maintenance, the unlawful "meddling in another's suit which was
supposed to suppress justice and
truth, orat least to work delay, and
the agreement to do this for a part
of the thing in suit was an aggravation of the offence, because of its
violation of the rule of common
law that choses in action are not
assignable, to support which the
doctrine of maintenance was adopted. "And upon no other reason,"
says Judge HARRINGTON, in Bayard v. McLane, 3 Harr., 209, "can
we conceive why a bargain for a
part, or the whole of a thing in suit
(independently'of the maintenance)
should have been an offence at
common law. Grant that no such
evils flow from the selling a thing
in action; grant that such a sale is
proper, and may be upheld and enforced by the law; and what conceivable reason is there for saying
that a bargain to give a thing in
suit, for lawful aid of counsel in the
prosecution of such suit, is itself
unlawful. But this rule of the com-
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mon law has long gone into disuse
even in the English courts; if any
traces of it remain, it is only for the
purpose of giving form to certain
kinds of actions. In this country
the rule is actually reversed. The
laws of alienation in respect to
every species of propexty promote
its transfer as more consistent with
the condition of things in action,
or of part of a thing in suit, may be
made; and, by the common law, it
is lawful for attorneys and counsel
in the regular exercise of their profession, to maintain the suits of oth.
ers. If the services, therefore, be
lawful, and the mode of compensation be now lawful, how can such a
contract be champertous and unlawful?"
Referring to the English statutes
against champerty which were
passed in the reign of Edward I.,
and seem to have introduced a new
feature into the definition of chainperty, Judge HARRINGTON continues, "The evil which they were deigned to meet was the conveyances
of pretended titles by those who
were unable and unwilling to incur
the expense of prosecuting them,
to men of wealth and power who
should carry on the prosecution at
their own expense and divide the
proceeds. Itwasa maintenance not
only by influence and power, but
by the actual means of conducting
a suit; and that on a contract for a
part of the thing in action, which
by the common law itself was unlawful. Hence, says the statute
champertors be they that move
pleas and suits or.causeto be moved
either by their own procurer or by
others and suedfor at their proper
cost, for to have part of the land in
variance or part of the gains. This
important ingredient of paying or
contributing to the expenses of the
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suit seems ever since to have been
regarded as essential to constitute
the offence ofchamperty. * * *
The payment of the expense is no
part of the business of a lawyer
under our practice. In so doing,
he acts out of his character as a
professional man and maintains the
suit in a way which that character
does notjustify. But so long as his
contract stipulates only for such
services as he may lawfully render
without being guilty of maintenance, it is not vitiated on any
ground ofchamperty, because those
services are to be requited out of
the thing in suit, which by our law
is a proper subject of contract."
Except in the cases specified by
paragraphs 73 and 74 of its code,
the doctrine of champerty has
been repudiated in New York as
not part of the common law of that
State: Coughlin v. R. R. Co., 71
N. Y., 443.
In Louisiana, the English Common Law not being part of its
jurisprudence, the matter is regulated by Article 2624 of its code.
In Michigan, by provision of H.
and S. Code, paragraph 9oo4, and
in Minnesota, Gen. St., 1878, c. 67,
i, attorneys and clients are allowed to contract as they please as
to compensation, and this provision
has effectually done away with the
doctrine of champerty in those
States: Whildey v. Crane, 63 Mich.,
720; Canty v. Lattimer, 31 M., 239.
The courts of Texas: Bentinck v.
Franklin, 38 Texas, 58; California:
Mattewsonv. Fitch, 22 Cal., 86;
New Jersey: Schomp v. Scheuck,
40 N. J. L., 195; and apparently
those of Arkansas: Lytle v. State,
17 Ark., 6o8; Vermont: Danforth
v. Streeter, 28 Vt., 49o; Connecticut: Richardson v. Rowland, 40
Conn., 565, and note to same, 14

Am. LAw REG., 78; and Pennsylvania (for the suggestion thrown
out by PAXTON, 3., in County of
Chester v. Barber, I Out., 463,
seems to have been confirmed by
the decision of Munna's Appeal,
127 Pa., 474, where a contract by
an attorney to raise up an administration, pay all the costs of suit
and divide the gross proceeds recovered was sustained), have in
effect declared that the common
law doctrine of champerty, so far
as it applies to contracts between
lawyer and client, forms no part of
the law of those States.
The reasons for so holding are
thus set forth in Matthewson v.
Fitch, sufira: "There is no statute
upon the subject in this State, and
we have no doubt that the Legislature of 185o, when it adopted the
statutes which were deemed necessary to organize the legal system of
the State by omitting to enact any
such statute, acted in the spirit of
the decisions which hold such laws
inapplicable to this country, and
with the direct purpose that there
should be no law relating to the
subject. In our judgment, in the
absence of such a statute, the offence of maintenance is unknown
to the laws of this State."
Chief Justice BEASriY, in delivering the opinion of the Court in
Schomp v. Scheuck, supra, expressed himself thus: "It appears
to me safe to say that, upon examination, any inquirer into this
branch of jurisprudence will be
satisfied that the entire doctrine of
maintenance was the product of a
state of society very different from
that which now exists or has ever
existed in this State.
"The truth is, there is the best
reason for believing that the entire
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law of maintenance, regarding it as
an intelligible subject, is the creation of the ]English statutory law
and of the judicial constructions of
such law, and the consequence is,
that when this set of Acts was designedly left out of our statute
book, there existed no rational
ground for the contention that any
part of this law of maintenance in
any form remained in force in this
State."
In most of the States it has been
held that even though the special
contract between an attorney and
his client be void for champerty,
he does not on that account forfeit
his claim to compensation for his
services, but may recover the same
on a quantiurm eruit: Weeks on
Attorneys,
345, and cases there
cited.
But the contrary was held in
Grell v. Levy, 16 C. B. (N. S.), 73.
See also Halloway v. Lowe, 7 Port.
(Ala.), 488, and Lowe v. Hutchinson, 37 Me., 196; Davis v. Sharron,,
15 B. Men. (Ky.), 64.
It is to be observed that the law
against champerty has never forbidden an attorney to advance
money for incidental costs: Lewis
v. Samuel, 8 Q. B., 485; but see
New York Code,
73, 74, which
forbids an attorney to make any
loan or advance or agreement to
loan or advance as an inducement
to place in his hands any claim for
collection.
After suit ended, an assignment
by client to attorney of part of the
judgment recovered in payment of
his fee will not be avoided even
though made in fulfilment of a
champertous contract: Rose v. the
Railroad Company, 55 Iowa, 691.
It is worthy of note that the
variance in the decisions on the
subject of champerty, in the States

where that doctrine is recognized at
all, is due solely to whether the definition of HAWKINS or that of
BLACKSTONB is accepted as correctly stating what was the common
law of Englind on the subject, so
that there is but little discussion as
to the wisdom of such a rule under
present conditions in the United
States. The ground-work on which
all these decisions rest being that
the doctrine is part of the inherited
jurisprudence of the State, it is unlikely that they will be modified,
and if a change in the law is desirable, it must come from the
Legislature. Viewed simply as a
measure of public policy, considered in its relation to contracts between lawyer and client, opinions
would probably differ as to its
utility. Given the business and
social relations found to-day in the
United States, the doctrine seems
to the writer both out of time and
out of place.
With an upright
judiciary, there is small incentive
to the lawyer to waste either time
or money in the prosecution of unjust claims, and under the jealous
scrutiny of the court to which such
contracts are subject, the danger to
the client from an unconscionable
bargain is inconsiderable.
Certainly the client is not the less well
served if the effortsof his attorney
be stimulated by his pecuniary in-

terest in the case, and though the
attorney may in rare cases be
thereby tempted to forget the fidel-

ity he owes to the court, yet it is
questionable whether the prohibition of such contracts lessens their
number, and there are other methods of preserving the honor of the
bar than by putting its members
under this disability.

To the credit of the profession be
it said that despite such Jaws a
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necessitous client is seldom forced
to abandon a just claim for lack
of means to prosecute the same;
though their existence makes it
possible for an ungrateful client to

GARCELON et al.

v.

defeat a just claim for services rendered without the certainty of reward.
H. GORDON McCoucH.

TIBBETTS.' SUPREME JUDICIAL COURT
OF MAINE.

Real Estate Broker-Commissionsand Combensation.
To entitle a broker who has been employed to sell real estate to commissions, he must produce a purchaser ready and willing to enter into a
contract on the employer's terms.
" This implies and involves the agreement of buyer and seller,
the
meeting of their minds, effected through the agency of the broker; and
if through their failure to come to an agreement, the contract of sale is
not consummated, he is not entitled to commissions, nor any recompense
for the time and labor he has spent.
When a broker is authorized to sell a certain piece of real estate for
a specified sum, but nothing is said as to the kind of a deed to be given;
and the broker procures a prospective purchaser, who refuses to complete
the contract of sale unless the owner of the land will give him a warranty
deed, which the latter, having a perfectly good title, declines to do, and
the sale consequently falls through; the broker fails to fulfil the conditions of his contract, and is not entitled to commissions.
Opinion by FOSTER, J.
THZ RIGHT O A REAL ESTATE BROKER TO COMMISSIONS.
Co., 83 N. Y., 378. In order to
I. In the absence of any special
fulfil thisduty, and substantiate his
clause in the contract of agency
claim, it is necessary that he should
affecting his rights, the claim of a
real estate broker to commissions produce a prospective purchaser
who is able, ready and willing to
upon the sale or exchange of real
take the land on the vendor's terms:
that
for
hands
his
estate placed in
Wylie v. Bank, 61 N. Y., 416; Mcpurpose depends upon the completion of the contract through his Gavock v. Woodlief, 20 How., (U.
S.) 221; Kock v. Emmerling, 22
"The fundamental and
agency.
correct doctrine is, that the duty How., (U. S.) 72; Keys v. Johnson,
68 Pa., 42; Clendenon v. Pancoast,
assumed by the broker is to bring
75 Pa., 213; Hyams v. Miller, 71 Ga.,
the minds of the buyer and seller
to an agreement for a sale, and the 6o8; Kalley v. Baker, 29 N. E. Rep.,
price and terms on which it is to be iog; Garcelon v. Tibbets (the principal case) 24 Atl. Rep., 797. These
made, and until that is done his
right to commissions does not ac- terms must be strictly complied
with in all essential particulars:
crue:" Sibbald v. Bethlehem Iron
IReported in 24 Atl. Rep., 797.

BROKER TO COMMISSIONS.
Bradford v. Menard (Minn.), 28 N.
V. Rep., 248. When a contract
with a broker statesthe terms of sale
to be $goo cash, and $ioo in one
year, the broker was denied the
right to commissions on producing
a purchaser who offered $ioo cash,
$8oo in thirty days, and $ooo in a
year: Harwood v. Triplett, 34 Mo.
App., 273. If the land is to be sold
for a certain price, and the purchaser offers part only in cash, the
owner may refuse to accept him
without making himself liable to
v. Davis,
the broker: Morrill
(Neb.) 43 N. W. Rep., 1146. But
when the agent is to receive all
above a certain sum as compensation, and the land is to be sold for
cash, a purchaser who pays the
stipulated sum in cash, and the
balance in notes, satisfies the
contract: Van Gorder v. Sherman, 46 N. W. Rep., 1o87. When
the sale is to include two surveys, and the broker only succeeds
in disposing of one, he can claim
no commissions on the sale: Armstrong v. O'Brien, i9 S. W. Rep.,
268.
The vendor may waive his right
of refusal, however, and accept a
sale made by a broker upon different terms from those at first proposed; and if he does so he becomes
liable for commissions: Lockwood
v. Halsey, 41 Kans., 166; S. C., 21
Pac. Rep., 98: Wetzell p. Wagoner,
41 Mo. App., Sog. When the purchaser agrees to pay the stated
price, but the owner of the land
sells for less, on discovering a mistake in the quantity, the broker is
entitled to commissions on the reduced price: Hoefling v. Hambleton, i9 S. W. Rep., 689. So, when
the broker is required, as a condition
precedent, to furnish his principal
with the name of the purchaser,
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but the principal makes no objection on that ground, while absolutely disaffirming the sale, he will
be held to have waived it: Duclos
v. Cunningham, 102 N. Y., 678. If
the principal accept the purchaser,
whether upon the same or different
terms, the broker is entitled to his
commissions, even though the sale
finally falls through, unless the
contract made the right to commissions dependent upon the consummation of the sale: Potvin v. Curran, 13 Neb., 302; Casady v. Seely,

N. W. Rep. (Iowa), 932; Carson
v. Baker, 29 Pac. Rep., 1134; Seattle
Land Co. v. Day, (Wash.) 27 Pac.
Rep., 74.
II. In order to prove a right to
commissions, the broker must first
show that he had authority to enter
into negotiations for the sale of the
property. Mere voluntary services
are not the ground of a valid clnim:
Cook v.Welch, 9 Allen, (Mass.) 35o;
Platt v. Patterson, 7 Phila. (Pa.),
29

135; Tinkham v. Knox, IS N. Y.

Suppl., 433; Coffin v, Luixweiler,
34 Minn., 320. This authority, how-

ever, need not be in writing: it may
be given by parol, for such an
agreement is not within the Statute
of Frauds: Real Estate Exchange
v. Stephens, (Mich.) 38 N. W. Rep.,
685; Monroe v. Snow, (I1.) 23 N.
R. Rep., .4o1; Fischer v. Bell, 9i
Ind., 243; Smith v. Armstrong, 24
Wis. 446; Turbeville v. Ryan, i
Humph. (Tenn.) 113; Mumley v.

Doherty, I Yerg., (Tenn.) 26; Fiero
v. Fiero, 52 Barb. (N. Y.), 288;
Blood v. Goodrich, 12 Wend. (N.
Y., 525; Worrall v. Munn, 5 N. Y.,
229;

Desmond v.

Stebbins,

140

Mass., 339. When not express, authority may be inferred from the
correspondence or course of dealing between the parties: Fisk v.
Henarie, 13 Or., 156; but the infer-
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ence must be clear and unequivocal.
When the principal wrote, "You
might let me know what per cent.
you charge, also what other expenses will arise,so that I may know exactly what tofigure on;" the Court
held that the authority of the agent
was limited, and that before any
definite action could be taken, the
matter must be again submitted to
the principal: Merritt v. Wasserich,
49 Fed. Rep., 785. An ownerwrote
to abroker, "I will be in D. the last
of April or first of May. Wish you
would have a purchaser. Think I
ought to have $17,000." The broker telegraphed on April 20, "Lots
sold for $16,ooo cash;" to which the
owner replied, "I will not sell for
less than $7,000." On May 3d, the
day of her arrival in D., the broker
telegraphed again, "Sold property
27th" of
for $7,000
.....
April. She did not receive the telegram until after she had reached
D., and then repudiated the transaction. Under these circumstances
it was held that the agent had no
authority to consummate the sale:
Sullivan v. Leer, 29 Pac. Rep., 817.
When, however, a firm of real estate brokers send a letter to the
owner of land, inclosing their business card, informing him of the
nature of their business, and asking
him whether the land is on the market, andits price, and the owner at
once replies, giving price, terms
and conditions, and stating the
amount of commissions he is willing to allow, and they at once begin
to act as agents for the sale of the
land, they are to be considered as
authorized agents: Stephens v.
Scott, 43 Kans., 285; S. C., 23 Pac.
Rep., 555.
When a duly authorized agent
appoints a sub-agent, within the
scope of his authority, though with-
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out the knowledge of his principal,
the sub-agent is entitled to commissions for producing a purchaser
after the revocation of the agent's
authority, but without notice to
him: Lamson v. Sims, 48 N. Y.,
Super. Ct., 281. The mere ordinary authority of a wife for her
husband, however, is not sufficient
to give authority to an agent employed by her to sell the lands of
her husband: Harper v. Goodall,
62 How. Pr. (N. Y.) 288. A man is
not bound by a contract for the
sale of his land made by a broker
in accordance with letters and telegrams sent by his wife, who, although attending to his correspondence and the rent of his property,
had no written authority to contract
for him, and sent the letters and
telegrams without informing him of
their contents: Edwards v. Tyler,
31 N. B. Rep., 312. When, however, the husband is the general
agent of the wife to sell her property, a broker employed by him is
her broker: Carroll v. O'Shea, 19
N. Y. Suppl., 374; Barnett v. Glutling kInd.) 29 N. E. Rep., 927.
Authority may also be inferred
from ratification of the broker's
acts: Low v. Conn., etc. R. R_., 46
N. H., 284. Where a broker volunt
teered himself as agent to renpremises belonging to .a city, and
represented to the defendant that
he was authorized to negotiate the
ease, but in an interview with the
city comptroller the defendant was
informed that the city would pay
no commission, and plaintiff suggested that his commission is one
per cent., which defendant promised to pay, there was evidence to
show that defendant employed the
broker: Myers vz. Dean, 30 N. E.
Rep., 259. The execution of a deed
by a wife to a purchaser secured by
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opinion as to the question upon
brokers by the husband without
which side lies the burden of proof
express authority, and the receipt
of this fact. It is asserted to be on
by her of the proceeds of sale, will
the principal in Goss v. Brown, 31
make her liable to the brokers for
Minn., 484; S. C., 18 N. W. Rep.,
commissions: Barnett v. Glutting
(Ind.) 29 N. E. Rep., 927; see Sims 290; Hart v. Hoffman, 44 How. Pr.
v,. Rockwell, 31 N. E. Rep., 484.' (N. Y.) 168; Simonson v. Kissick,
4 Daly (N. Y.) 143; Cook v. KroeOne who sells the real estate of a
corporation must establish employ- meker, 4 Daly (N. Y.) 268. On the
ment by a competent party, au- other hand it was asserted to rest
upon the broker in Iselin v. Griffith,
thorized to bind the corporation,
sufira; S. C., z8 N. W. Rep., 302;
or prove a subsequent knowledge,
adoption and ratification of his Coleman's Ex'r. v. Meade, 13 Bush,
(Ky.) 358; Pratt v. Hotchkiss, io
services by the corporation: Twelfth
Ill. App., 6o3; Leahy v. Hair, 33
St. Market Co. v. Jackson, 1o2 Pa.,
269; Copeland v,. Stoneham Tan- Ill. App., 461; Zeidler v. Walker,
nery Co. (Pa.) 21 Ad. Rep., 825. 41 Mo. App., n8. The former
An intention to ratify an unauthor- would seem to be the better opinion,
ized employment of a broker by an however, for, as was said in Grosse
v. Cooley, 43 Minn., 188, the preattorney is shown by a promise to
sumption is that the purchaser is
pay the broker the sum promised
by the attorney: Markham v. Wash- solvent: McFarland v. Lillard
(Ind.) 28 N. R. Rep., 229. His
burn, 18 N. Y. Suppl., 355; but in
general, before ratification can be solvency does not form a condition
inferred, it must be shown that the precedent, but the lack of it is a
matter of defence.
owner of the land had knowledge
When the sale is not consumof the particular conditions of the
mated and the seller repudiates it
transaction: Niaze v. Gordon (Cal.)
on adcount of the financial inability
30 Pac. Rep., 962.
When a will gives authority to of the purchaser, the broker is not
the executors to sell real estate, entitled to commissions; and where
they can employ an agent, and the the purchaser, on the last day for
estate will be liable for his com- payment of the balance of the purchase money, asked for additional
missions: Armstrong ,. O'Brien,
59 S. W. Rep., 268; but a promise time, and the seller waited for four
to compensate a broker if he finds weeks before breaking off the transa purchaser, followed by a sale by action, there is good ground to inthe promisor as administrator, is fer pecuniary inability: Butler v.
a personal contract, unconnected Baker, 23 At. Rep., ioI9. If the
with the ownership of the lands: sale is actually made, however, andMoore v. Daiber, 52 N.W. Rep., 742. the binding contract entered into,
III. It is also necessary that the which can be enforced, the owner
prospective purchaser should be will be held to have determined in
pecuniarily able, as well as willing, favor of the responsibility of the
purchaser, and to have assumed
to consummate the contract of sale,
or if he make default, to respond in the risk of his proving irresponsible: Wray v. Carpenter (Col.) 27
damages for his breach of contract:
Pac. Rep., 248. When the purIselin v. Griffith, 62 Iowa, 668.
There has been a conflict of chaser is solvent and able to pay,
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but for some reason defaults and
allows the vendor to declare a forfeiture under the contract, the
broker is entitled to his commission: Betz v. Loan Co. (Xan.) 26
Pac. Rep., 456.
IV. In order to substantiate a
claim for commissions, the sale
must have been effected through
the agency of the broker who
claims them. It is not essential,
however, that he should actually
carry the transaction to a conclusion; it is sufficient if the owner
concludes the sale by following out
the negotiations begun by the
broker: Butler v. Kennard (Neb.),
36 N. V. Rep., 579; Nicholas v.
Jones (Neb.), 37 N. V. Rep., 679;
Wilson v. Sturgis (Cal.), I6 Pac.
Rep., 772; Dreisback v. Rollins
(Kan.), I8 Pac. Rep., 187; Desmond
v. Stebbins, i4o Mass., 339; Bickart
v. Hoffman, i9 N. Y. Suppl., 472;
or if the sale is due to the exertions
of the broker: Jones v. Berry, 37
Mo. App., i25; Scott v. Patterson
(Ark.), 13 S. W. Rep., 419. When
a broker who has property in his
hands for sale advertises it and
gives information about it to a
third party, who communicates
such information to a friend, and
the friend afterwards buys directly
from the owner, the broker is entitled to commissions: Lincoln v.
McClatchie, 36 Conn., 136; see
Newhall v. Pierce, 115 Mass., 457.
The same is true where a neighbor,
seeing the advertisement, directs a
buyer to the farm: Anderson v.
But when the
Cox, i6 Neb., .o.
broker had negotiated with one
who refused to buy, but advised
another person to do so, and this
third person bought directly of the
owner, without any preliminary
megotiations with the broker, it was

held that there was nothing to show
that the broker procured the sale:
Johnson v. Seidel (Pa.), 24 Atl.
Rep., 687. If the prospective purchaser breaks off the negotiations
with the broker and afterwards
enters into fresh negotiations with
the principal, who succeeds in
effecting a sale, the broker is not
entitled to any commission: Lipe v.
Ludewick, 14 Ill. App., 372; Alden
v. Earle (N. Y.), 24 N. E. Rep.,
7o5. And in general, when the
efforts of the broker have been unsuccessful, it does not matter that
they contributed in some degree to
the final result: Sibbald v. Bethlehem Iron Co., 83 N. Y., 378. If
parties with whom he has negotiated unsuccessfully buy through
other agents, without any interference on the part of the owner, he
has no valid claim: Hendricks v.
Daniels, 19 N. Y. Suppl., 414; Earp
v. Cummins, 54 Pa., 394; Doonan
v. Ives, 73 Ga., 295; Wylie v. Marine
National Bank, 6I N. Y., 416; Livezey v. Miller, 61 Md., 336; Smith
v. McGovern, 65 N. Y., 574; Ward
v. Fletcher, 124 Mass., 224; Farrar
v. Brodt, 35 Ill. App., 617. And,
of course, if the parties fail to come
to an agreement on the terms on
which the vendor insists, and the
negotiations are consequently unsuccessful, he has not performed
his contract to find a purchaser, and
has not earned his commissions:
Garcelon v. Tibbets (the principal
case) 24 AUt. Rep., 797.
If the contract of agency is fixed
as to duration, the broker must
produce a purchaser within the
time limited; but not so that all the
papers necessary to complete the
sale can be executed within that
time: O'Connor v. Semple, 57 Wis.,
243. When, however, a purchaser
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produced on the last day of the
specified time wishes time to investigate the title, it is too late, and
the vendor can rightfully refuse to
entertain the proposition: Watson
v. Brookes, ji Oreg., 271; see McCarthy v. Cavers, 66 Iowa, 342. If
he have to complete the sale by a
certain date, the transaction must
be closed then or within whatever
extension the vendor may grant:
Emery v. Atlanta Real Est. Exch.,
14 S. E. Rep., 556. But if he have
a reasonable time in which to find
purchaser, a rise in value during
that time will not excuse therefusal
of the vendor to accept a purchaser
on the original terms: Smith v.
Fairchild, 7 CoL, 510.
The services rendered by the
broker must also be of value: and
he does not render any efficient
service by securing a proposition
from a person with whom the
owner has been in treaty prior to
the time when the land was placed
in the broker's hands, and who, on
the same day that he makes the
offer through the broker, offers the
same amount to the owner: Hartley
v. Anderson (Pa.), 24 Atl. Rep., 675;
see White v. Templeton, 79 Tex.,
454The contract of sale effected by
the broker need not be completed
by conveyance: Hayden v. Grills's
Admrs., 42 Mo. App., i. It is
enough that a valid contract of sale
is entered into by the owner with
the purchaser introduced to him by
the broker, even though the vendor
may afterward refuse to perform the
contract; for the owner may, if he
so choose, reap the benefit of the
transaction by a suit for specific
performance: Love v. Miller, 53
Ind., 294; Love v. Owens, 31 Mo.
App., 5ox; Veazie z. Parker, 72 Me.,
443; Kerfoot v. Steele, 113 Ill., 6ro.

V. When, however, the broker
has complied with all the terms of
his contract, and has procured a
purchaser and bound him by contract to take the land at the vendor's terms or such modified terms
and conditions as the vendor has
seen fit to accept, his right to commissions is absolute and cannot be
defeated by any inability on the
part of the vendor to fulfil his part
of the contract, or by any attempt
on the part of the latter to evade
his responsibility to the broker:
Gross v. Stevens, 32 Minn., 472;
Love v. Miller, 53 Ind., 294; Mooney
v. Elder, 56 N. Y., 238; Knapp v.
Wallace, 4r N. Y., 477; Higgins v.
Moore, 34 N. Y., 417; Chapin v.
Bridges, x6 Mass., iO5; Drury v.
Newman, 99 Mass., 256; Cook v.
Fisher, 12 Gray (Mass.), 491; Rice
v. Mayo, io7 Mass., 55o; Delaplaine
v. Tumley, 44 Wis., 31; Phelan v.
Gardner, 43 Cal., 3o6; Nesbit v.
Helser, 49 Mo., 383.
If the purchaser refuses to complete the sale on account of a defect in the title of the vendor, of
which the broker was ignorant, or
on account of misrepresentations
of the vendor, the broker is still
entitled to his commissions: Glentworth v. Luther, 21 Barb. (N. Y.),
145; Doty v. Miller, 43 Barb. (N.
Y.), 529; Schwartz v. Yearley, 3i
Md., 270; De Santos v. Taney, 13
La. Arm., ii: Gonzales v. Broad,
57 Cal., 224; Cook v. Welch, 9 Allen
(Mass.), 35o; Topping v. Healey,
3 F. & F., 325; Roberts v. Kimmins, 65 Miss., 332; S. C., 3 So.
Rep., 736; Mooney v. Elder, 56 N.
Y., 238; Hannan v. Moran, 71 Mich.
261; S. C., 38 N. W. Rep., go9; McLaughlin v. Wheeler (S. Dak.), 47
N. W. Rep., 8!6; Kyle v. Kippey
(Or.), 26 Pac. Rep., 308; Conklin
v. Krakauer, 70 Tex., 735; S. C.,
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ii S. W. Rep., 1i7; contra, Blankenship v. Ryerson, 50 Ala., 426.
"The implication, when property
is placed in the hands of a real
estate broker for sale, is that the
owner has a good title thereto, and
that the purchaser can get the property unincumbered. When, therefore, a proposed purchaser agrees
to buy, nothing being said about
the title, he has the right to believe
he will get a good title:" Loan Co.
v. Thompson, 86 Ala., 146; S. C.,
5 So. Rep., 473; Gerhart v. Peck,
42 Mo. App., 644; Gauthier v. West,
45 Minn., 192; S. C., 47 N. W. Rep.,
656. And in such a case the agent
has a right to presume that the title
is unobjectionable and to negotiate
a sale upon that presumption:
Cheatham v. Yarbrough, 15 S. W.
Rep., 1076. If, however, the agent
was aware of the defect in the title
of his principal, would seem that
he has no right to commissions on
such an ineffectual sale: Tombs v.
Alexander, iol Mass., 255. The
fact that the purchaser's objection
to the title is groundless will not
affect the broker when a written
contract of sale has been executed;
for in such a case the vendor has
the option of enforcing specific performance, and his neglect to avail
himself of that remedy ought not
to prejudice the broker: Parker v.
Walker (Tenn.), 8 S. W. Rep., 391;
but if the contract rests in parol,
and is therefore unenforceable, the
broker is not entitled to claim com:missions, presumably on the ground
.that it was his duty to see that the
:ale was made effective by the execution of a valid and binding contract: Gilchrist v. Clarke (Tenn.),
8 S. W. Rep., 572. Even if the
contract with the broker expressly
provides that the broker's commissions are to be paid out of the pro-

ceeds of the sale, if the sale falls
through on account of a defect in
the title of the vendor, the broker
is nevertheless entitled to commissions: Cheatham v. Yarbrough
(Tenn.), 15 S. W. Rep., io76.
If it was agreed in the contract
with the agent that the wife of the
vendor should join in the conveyance of the property, and she afterwards refuses to do so, in consequence of which the purchaser
throws up the transaction, the facts
make out aprimafaciecase in favor
of the claim for commissions: Hamlin v. Schulte (Minn.), 27 N. W.
Rep., 3oi, Clapp v. Hughes, i
Phila. (Pa.), 382.
If the sale falls through in consequence of the refusal of the purchaser to perform his contract,
without any default on the part of
the vendor, the broker is not entitled to commissions, for he has
not produced a purchaser: Hyams
v. Miller, 71 Ga., 608; Parmly v.
Head, 33 Ill. App., 134; Yeager v.
Kelsey (Minn.), 49 N. W. Rep., 199;
Garcelon v. Tibbett, 24 Atl. Rep.,
797. And if the failure to effect a
sale or exchange is due to the misrepresentations of the other party,
which lead the principal to refuse
to go on with the transaction, the
broker cannot recover: Rockwell v.
Newton, 44 Conn., 333.
When the broker has commenced
negotiations with a prospective purchaser, the owner cannot save his
commissions by taking the matter
out of the broker's hands, and
completing the transaction himself, especially when the broker
has a reasonable time in which to
make the sale: Lane v. Albright,
49 Ind., 275; Keys v. Johnson, 68
Pa., 42; Briggs v. Boyd, 56 N. Y.,
289; Doonan v. Ives, 73 Ga., 295;
nor can he sell to others during the
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time he has allowed the parties in- pay the broker anything, the busitroduced by the broker to decide, ness of a broker would not be
worth pursuing; gross injustice
and so defeat the broker's claim:
Reed v. Reed, 82 Pa., 42o. Not- would be done; every unfair and
illiberal vendor would limit his
withstanding a revocation of his
authority, the broker is entitled to property at a price slightly above
commissions, if the revocation was the market, and make use of the
made with a view to defeat his broker to bring it into notice, and
right to them: Heaton v. Edwards, then make his own terms with the
buyers, who were, in reality, proSi N. W. Rep., 544; Smith v. Anderson (Idaho), 21 Pac. Rep., 412; cured by the efforts of the agent:"
Knox v. Parker (Wash.), 25 Pac.
Chilton v. Butler, I E. D. Smith,
i51. Where the owner sells at a
Rep., 9o9; Blumenthall v. Goodall
(Cal.), 26 Pac. Rep., 9o6; and the reduced price, however, the broker
revocation of the authority of an is not entitled to commissions on
agent, without notice to a validly the original price, but on the actual
appointed sub-agent, will not affect selling price: Martin v. Silliman,
the rights of the latter: Lamson v. 53 N. Y., 615; Lawrence v. Atwood,
Sims, 48 N.Y. Super. Ct., 281.
1 Ill. App, 217; Stewart v. Mather,
If the owner changes the terms 32 Wis., 344; Jones v. Adler, 34
of the sale, and the sale conse- Md., 44o; Richards v. Jackson, 31
quently falls through, the broker Md., 250; Lincoln v. McClatchie,
has a valid claim: Gorman v. 36 Conn., 136; Nesbit v. Helser, 49
Scholte, 13 Daly (N. Y.), 516. The
MO., 383.
If the defendant, however, has
same is true when the owner ignores the agent, and sells to the acted in good faith in revoking the
parties, with whom the latter has agent's authority, or changing the
been negotiating, on terms differ- terms of sale, or if he concludes
ent from those on which he was the transaction in ignorance of the
authorized to sell: Reynolds v. fact that the purchaser has preTompkins, 23 W. Va., 229; Dailey viously been in negotiation with
v. Young, 13 N. Y. Suppl., 435; the agents, he will not be liable to
Plant v. Thompson, 42 Kans., 664, the latter for commissions: CathS. C. 22, Pac. Rep. 726; McCon- cart v. Bacon (Minn.), 49 N. W.
App.,
aughy v. Mahammah, 28 Ill.
Rep., 331; Blodgett v. Sioux City,
etc., R. R., 63 Iowa, 6o6.
169; Levy v. Coogan, 9 N. Y. Suppl.,
When the broker is not in fault,
534. "If vendors were permitted
to employ brokers to look up pur- a bare refusal by the vendor to acchasers, and call the attention of cept the purchaser tendered him,
buyers to the property which they will not defeat his right to commisdesired to sell, limiting them as to sions: Harwood v. Diemer, 41 Mo.
terms of sale, and then, while such App., 48; Monroe v. Snow (Ill.),
23 N. E. Rep., 4o1; Greenwood v.
purchasers were negotiating, take
the matter into their own hands, Burton (Neb.), 44 N. W. Rep., 28.
avail themselves of the services And when the owner will not sign
and expenses of the broker in an agreement to sell, required by
bringing the property in the mar- the purchaser, it is tantamount to
ket, and effect a sale by an abate- a refusal to sell: Neilson v. Lee, 6o
Cal., 555. If the owner, knowing
ment in the price, and yet refuse to
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that a part of the land he has tion of the authority of the others;
placed in the broker's hands be- all agreements to sell, made by
longs to a railroad company, re- them, are made at the risk of such
fuses to sell unless paid for that, revocation; and a subsequent prothe broker is entitled to commis- duction of a purchaser will not ensions: Cawker v. Apple, 15 Col., title them to commissions: Ahern
141; S. C., 25 Pac. Rep., i8I.
v. Baker (Minn.), 24 N. W. Rep.,
Any other device to evade pay- 341; Goldsmith v. Cook, i4 N. Y.
ment of commissions is equally in- Suppl., 878; Francis v. Eddy, 52
effectual. If, by the agreement of N. W. Rep., 42. If the employsale, the vendor is to furnish a ment of another agent is not known
perfect abstract of title, and he
to a broker, however, he is entitled,
fraudulently procures a rejection
if he produce a purchaser before he
of the title for the purpose of de- receives notice of a previous sale:
feating the sale, the broker is still Fox v. Rouse, 47 Mich., 558.
entitled: Phelps v. Prusch, 83 Cal.,
VII. Whether the employment of
626; S. C., 23 Pac. Rep., iiii. the agent be exclusive or not, the
Commissions are due if, pending principal still has the right to sell
the transaction, the owner gives on his own account, the only limithe land in question to his son, and tations being that he must not sell
the son finally consummates it un- to one with whom the agent is
der the father's directions: Fox v. negotiating, and must give him
Byrnes, 52 N. Y. Super. Ct., 150. If notice of his own sale: McClave v.
a contract of sale, not in writing, is Paine, 49 N. Y., 56I; Wylie v.
broken by the vendor, he cannot Marine Nat'l Bank, 6I N. Y.415;
set up the invalidity of the contract Lloyd v. Matthews, 51 N. Y., 125;
as a defence to an action by the Stewart v. Murray, 92 Ind., 543;
broker for his commissions: Mc- Hungerford v. Hicks, 39 Conn.,
Farland v. Tillard (Ind.), 28 N. E.
259; Dolan v. Scanlary, 57 Cal.,
Rep., 220.
261; Hill v. Jebb, 18 S. V. Rep.,
When it is agreed that no com1,047; Learned v. McCoy, 30 N. E.
mission shall be due until the Rep., 717; Dole v. Sherwood, 41
property is paid for, and the testi- Minn., 535; S. C., 43 N. W. Rep.,
mony shows that a judgment was 569. To establish his claim in the
obtained by notes taken for the latter case, however, the agent
property, and that the vendor re- must prove that he had a purchaser
leased the judgment, extended the for the property: Waterman v.
time of payment thereof for sev- Boltinghouse, 82 Cal., 659; S. C.,
eral years, and assured the agent
23, Pac. Rep., 195. But a broker,
that his commissions were fully
who, only three or four days after
earned and payable, it will support his employment, procures a purthe recovery of the commissions: chaser ready, able and willing to
C. Aultman & Co. v. Ritter, 5I N. buy at the owner's price and terms,
W. Rep., 569.
is entitled to his commissions. AlVI. When several brokers are though the land was sold by the
employed to sell the same piece of owners on the very day it was put
land, with notice of each other's
into the broker's hands, no notice
employment, a sale, by any one of having been given him until he inthem, works an immediate revoca- formed the owners of his sale. "It is
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true the defendants had the right to
sell the property themselves, as they
did, and that the sale, rightfully
made by them, necessarily prevented the completion of the subsequent sale, put on foot by plaintiffs; but it by no means follows
that plaintiffs were thereby deprived of their right to compensation. When defendants sold their
property, it became their duty to
notify plaintiffs of that fact, and
until that was done, the contract
relation between them continued.
After defendants sold their property, they remained silent as to the
fact of sale, at their peril, so far as
the plaintiffs were concerned. It
would be unjust to permit the
agent to go on in the work of his
principal until he has accomplished
all he was employed to do, and
then tell him, when the labor was
done and expense incurred, that he
should receive no compensation,
because the principal, though without notice to him, had, by other
means, attained the desired end" :
Woodall v. Foster (Tenn.), iS S.
W. Rep., 241. See Iane v. Albright, 49 Ind., 275.
VIII. The broker must act with
perfect good faith toward his principal. Any fraudulent misrepresentation or concealment will destroy his right to commissions:
Segar v. Parrish, 20 Gratt (Va.)
672; Vennum v. Gregory, 21 Iowa,
326; Coleman v. Meade, 13 Bush.
(Ky.) 358; see Collins v. McClurg
(Col.) 29 Pac. Rep., 299. Where
the purchaser agreed to pay the
stipulated price if the broker would
endeavor to persuade the vendor
to take less, and conceal the agreement from him, it was held bad
faith on the part of the broker:
Pratt v. Patterson, 112 Pa., 475.
Such action will also entitle the

vendor to refuse a subsequent offer
to take the property on his terms:
Martin v. Bliss, io N. Y., Suppl.,
886. But misrepresentations, not
made with fraudulent intent, which
do not mislead the vendor, or as to
the truth of which he is in a position to judge, will not affect the
broker's rights: Irwin v. Mowbray, 5 N. Y. Suppl., 430; Coe v.
Ware, 4o Minn., 4o4; S. C., 42 N.
W. Rep., 205. So an agreement
between real estate brokers and
one of three purchasers to divide
their commissions with him, con-.
cealed from the other purchasers
and from the vendor, does not deprive the brokers of their right to
commissions, where it does not appear to have prejudiced the vendor:
Chase v. Veal, 18 S. W. Rep., 597.
IX. As a general rule, a broker
cannot recover commissions from
both parties to a transaction, on
the ground that "no man can serve
two masters," and that such action
must necessarily make him less
eager for the interests of his immediate employer: Ingraham v.
Home (Ill.) 16 N. B. Rep., 868;
Armstrong v. O'Brien, 19 S. W.
Rep., 268; Carroll v. O'Shea, 18
N. Y. Suppl., 146, unless he can
show that the fact of his double
employment was known to both
parties: Prankel v. Wathen, 12 N.
Y. Suppl., 591; Kronenberger v.
Fricke, 22 111. App., 55o; Collins V.
Fowler, 8 Mo. App., 588; Rowe v.
Stevens, 53 N. Y., 621. He must
show that his own principal was
fully aware of his employment by
the other party: Bonwell v. Howes,
x N. Y. Suppl., 435; Condit v. Sill,
I8 N. Y. Suppl., 97; Jarvis v.
Schaefer, 1o5 N. Y., 289: De Steiger
v. Hollington, 17 Mo. App., 382, or
he will forfeit all izlaims to commissions from him: Uverhart v. Searle,
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71 Pa., 256; Smith v. Townshend,
lO9 Mass., 5oo. One, however,
who in making an exchange of
property merely brings the parties
together, they making their own
contract, can recover commissions
from both: Orton v. Scofield, 61
Wis., 382; see Green v Robertson,
,64 Cal., 75, contra; Bates v. Copeland, 4 MacArthur (D. C.) r o.
X. If the broker is acting in violation of a law or ordinance which
requires the payment of a license
before he can engage in the brokerage business, he cannot recover
commissions on sales effected by
him: Johnson v. Hulings, 103 Pa.,
498; Stevenson v. Ewing (Tenn.)
9 S.W. Rep., 23o; Angell v. Van
Schaick (N. Y.) 30 N. R. Rep., 395;
Buckley v. Humason, 52 N. W.
Rep., 385.
XI. If the amount of commissions or compensations is specially
provided for in the agreement with
the broker, that of course governs;
but when the amount is undetermined, the broker is entitled to a
reasonable compensation, unless
there is no evidence of his employment: Harrell v. Zimplemary, 66
Tex., 292; Hollis v. Weston, 31 N.
B. Rep., 483; Coffin v. Luixweiler,
34 Minn., 32o. This maybe proved
by evidence of the price generally
said to a broker for such services,
whether the plaintiff is a regular
broker or not: Hollis v. Weston,
supira. When the commissioners
usually paid range from five to
twenty-five per cent., and there is
no evidence of any uniform custom
or usage in that regard, the proper
measure of compensation is the
value ofthe services rendered: Potts
v. Aechternacht, 93 Pa., 138. And
when the evidence as to the agreed
compensation is conflicting it is
competent to show that the compensation claimed by the broker is

reasonable and not unusual: Greer
zo.Lows, i8 S. NV. Rep., 1038.
A broker is not entitled to commissions on a sum paid for the
option to purchase, which is never
exercised: Gilder v. Davis, 18 N.Y.,
Suppl., 544; but when a broker,
employed without any special
agreement as to payment of compensation, procures a purchaser,
who defaults after payment of $io,ooo, he is entitled to pro rata commissions: Peters v. Anderson, 14
S. E. Rep., 974. If the vendor
agrees to allow the broker a commission on sales made by himself,
he is only liable for actual sales, not
for a transfer to secure debts: Terry
v. Wilson's Est., (Minn.) 52 N. W.
Rep., 973.
When the broker procures a person with whom the principal makes
a sealed contract of exchange, but
informs the principal that he will
charge no commission if the exchange is not consummated, the
oral promise, made after performance of his original contract and
without consideration, is not binding on him: Little v. Rees, (Minn.)
26 N. WV. Rep., 7; Bash v. Emerich,
59 N. Y. Super. Ct., 548.
XIL A broker is entitled to commissions upon an exchange in the
same manner as upon a sale; and
his right thereto is governed by the
same rules and is subject to the
same qualifications and limitations
as in the latter instance: Hewett v.
Brown, 21 Minn., 163; Redfield v.
Tegg, 38 N. Y., 212.
[NoTz.-Owing to lack of space,
the above annotation aims chiefly to
present the recent cases on the subject. The earlier ones will be found
collected in the Am. and Eng. Encyc. of Law, Vol. II., PP. 578-589.
and 30 Am. Law Reg., 114.]
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